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It has long been known that social welfare in a homogeneous good Cournot oligopoly will 
increase when firms have more heterogeneous costs (Bergstrom and Varian, 1985; Février and 
Linnemer).  Recent research has demonstrated the relevance of cost dispersion in this market 
structure when the firms cooperate at an earlier stage (Salant and Shaffer, 1999; Van Long and 
Soubeyran, 2001).  Initially symmetric firms have incentives to cooperate at an earlier stage in 
order to create later-stage cost asymmetries so that total profit to oligopolists is maximized.  In 
this class of models, early cooperation will also increase social welfare because aggregate output 
is invariant to cost dispersion.  This letter extends the analysis on social welfare to oligopoly in 
plural markets.  In a two-product Cournot oligopoly, we show how correlation between unit costs 
matters when the outputs are complements or substitutes in demand.  The same essential insights 
apply for a three-product oligopoly under complementarity in demand, but the rearrangement in 
cost structure needs to be more qualified in order to avoid interaction effects.  
 
1.  Two products 
A fixed set of N  firms, denoted as {0,1,2, ... , 1} Nn N∈ − =Ω , each produce strictly 
positive amounts of goods x  and y  in a two-market Cournot oligopoly.  The nth firm produces 
quantity nx  of good x  at constant unit cost 
n
xc , and firm outputs in this market are perfect 
substitutes.  The nth firm produces ny  of good y  at unit cost 
n
yc  and firm outputs in this market 
are also perfect substitutes.  Aggregate outputs are 
N
nn
X x∈Ω=∑  and N nnY y∈Ω=∑ .   
With linear-in-income ( I ) and concave preferences for a representative consumer, the 
utility function may be specified as ( , , ) ( , )u X Y I I U X Y= + .  Inverse demands for the goods 
are given as continuously differentiable functions 
 ( , ); ( , );x yx yP U X Y P U X Y= =  (1) 
where the law of demand requires ( ) 0xxU ⋅ ≤  and ( ) 0yyU ⋅ ≤ .  The solutions to (1) are demand 
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functions ( , )D x yX P P  and ( , )D x yY P P . 
The nth firm’s profit is  
 ( ) ( ) ,n n nx x n y y nU c x U c yπ    = ⋅ − + ⋅ −     (2) 
with private optimality derivatives  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ( ) ( ) .n nx xx n xy n x y xy n yy n yU U x U y c U U x U y c⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =  (3) 
We assume unique interior solutions throughout, with firm values ˆ ˆ( , ),n n Nx y n∈Ω .  Write 
N
x n
xn
C c∈Ω=∑  and Ny nynC c∈Ω=∑ , then sum (3) across firms to observe that xC  and yC  are 
sufficient statistics for identifying how aggregate outputs ˆ ˆ
N
nn
X x∈Ω=∑  and ˆ ˆN nnY y∈Ω=∑  
relate to costs.  Consumer surplus will not change so long as all firms produce while unit cost 
sums are xC  and yC . 
With 2[ ] 0xx yy xyU U U∆ = − >  from the preference structure, write (3) at Nash solutions in 
matrix form as  
 
ˆ ˆ 1 .
ˆ ˆ
n n
xx xy yy xyn nx x x x
n n
xy yy xy xxn ny y y y
U U U Ux xc U c U
U U U Uy yc U c U
−   − −      = ⇒ =            −− −∆         
 (4) 
With c  representing the ordered set of costs 0 1 1 0 1 1( , , ... , , , , ... , )N Nx x x y y yc c c c c c
− − , aggregate profit is  
 
( ) ( )2 2
[ ]( )
[ ]
2 .
N
N N N
x
n x yx x
yy xy xy y yy xn
y
y yy x
xx xy xy x xx y
yy xyn n n nxx
x x y yn n n
U NU CV c U C U C U U U U
U NU C
U C U C U U U U
U U Uc c c c
π∈Ω
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
−   = = × − + −  ∆ ∆
−   + − + −  ∆ ∆
− + −∆ ∆ ∆
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 (5) 
Only the last three summation terms depend on cost statistics other than xC  and yC .  
Following Lapan and Hennessy (2002), assert 
Definition 1.  Consider the function 0 1 1 0 1 1( , , ... , ; , , ... , ) :
N N
N Nf x x x y y y− − × →\ \ \ .  Let 
operation (0,1, ... , 1)N τ− D  map (0,1, ... , 1)N −  onto ( (0), (1), ... , ( 1))Nτ τ τ − , a permutation 
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on NΩ .  Then ( )f ⋅  is said to be permutation invariant if 0 1 0 1( , ... , ; , ... , )N Nf x x y y− − ≡  
(0) ( 1) (0) ( 1)( , ... , ; , ... , )N Nf x x y yτ τ τ τ− −  for all permutations on NΩ . 
 
Definition 2.  The function ( )f ⋅  in definition 1 is said to exhibit permutation order if 
0 1 (0) ( 1) 0 1 0 1( , ... , ; , ... , ) ( , ... , ; , ... , )N N N Nf x x y y f x x y yτ τ− − − −≥  for all permutations τ  on NΩ  
that a) interchange two indices j  and k  for which ( )( ) 0j k j kx x y y− − ≤ , and b) leave all other 
indices unchanged.  
 
Definition 3.  The function ( )f ⋅  in definition 1 is said to be arrangement increasing (AI) if it 
exhibits permutation invariance and permutation order.  It is said to be arrangement decreasing 
(AD) if ( )f− ⋅  is AI. 
 
The simplest AI function is ( )
N
n nn
f x y∈Ω⋅ =∑ , where ( ) ( )N Nn n n nn nx y x yτ τ∈Ω ∈Ω=∑ ∑  
demonstrates permutation invariance and j k k j j j k kx y x y x y x y+ ≥ +  under ( )( ) 0j k j kx x y y− − ≤  
demonstrates permutation order.  Turning to demand-side interactions, we say that x  and y  
complement (substitute) in demand if ( , ) / ( , ) / ( ) 0D x y y D x y xX P P P Y P P P∂ ∂ ≡ ∂ ∂ ≤ ≥ .  It follows 
from (1) that the goods complement (substitute) in demand whenever ( ) 0xyU ≥ ≤ .  
Proposition 1.  If x and y are complements (substitutes) in demand, then social welfare is 
arrangement increasing (decreasing) in unit costs. 
Proof. A sequence of interchanges satisfying definition 2 leaves the values of ( )2
N
n
xn
c∈Ω∑  and 
( )2
N
n
yn
c∈Ω∑  invariant.  But the sequence increases the value of N n nx yn c c∈Ω∑  as it is an AI 
function.  Given complementarity in demand, 12
N
n n
xy x yn
U c c− ∈Ω∆ ∑  is AI and increases along the 
sequence.  All other terms on the right-hand side in (5) do not change in value because xC  and 
 4
yC  do not change.  So the value of ( )V c  at Nash equilibrium increases under the sequence of 
interchanges.  The values of Xˆ  and Yˆ  do not change and neither does consumer surplus.  Social 
welfare, the sum of industry profits and consumer surplus, must increase.  Given substitution in 
demand, then 12
N
n n
xy x yn
U c c− ∈Ω∆ ∑  is AD and similar logic applies.    G 
 
The cost rearrangement makes the firms that are most competitive (low cost) in one market 
more competitive in the other too.  Viewing (3), when there is complementarity in demand then a 
strengthening of the cost correlation helps market incentives to guide production toward lower 
cost firms.  Market power across products and firms will be reassigned, but the overall effect of 
market power in the marketplace will be unaffected in the sense that market outputs do not 
change under the AI cost rearrangement.  So industry cost declines while outputs do not change. 
When there is substitution in demand, then firms with low unit costs in one product have a 
revenue-side incentive to be low output in the second product.  A firm with low unit costs in both 
outputs will have strong incentives to under-produce relative to the firm’s comparative cost 
advantages, so market power incentives tend to distort production toward higher-cost firms. 
We conclude this section with an alternative perspective on increasing correlation.  When 
unit costs correlate positively, correlation should increase if we increase the magnitude of a 
product’s high unit cost and compensate by decreasing the magnitude of a low unit cost for that 
product.  From (5) we know that social welfare increases in the two product model if the constant 
sums cost structure change increases the value of ( )22
N N
n n n
xy x y yy xn n
U c c U c∈Ω ∈Ω−∑ ∑  
( )2
N
n
xx yn
U c∈Ω− ∑ .  Without loss of generality, let product x  unit costs be ordered by the firm 
index, i.e., 0 1 1... Nx x xc c c
−≤ ≤ ≤ .  Additional structure is required on how unit costs are arranged.  
Definition 4.  Unit costs kyc  and 
m
yc , k m< , are said to be positively arranged if k my yc c≤  and 
negatively arranged if k my yc c> . 
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Fixing the values of the nxc , consider the following rearrangement of the 
n
yc : 1) 
j j
y yc c→ ≡  
, ,jy Nc j j k j m∀ ∈Ω ≠ ≠ ; 2) k k ky y yc c c ε→ ≡ −  and m m my y yc c c ε→ ≡ +  where 0ε >  and k m< .1  
Sums of unit costs do not change after this change in unit costs for product y .  Under 1) and 2), 
the difference in oligopoly profits satisfies  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
sign
m k k m
x x xy y y yyV c V c c c U c c Uε− = − − − +  (6) 
Under 2), if products complement in demand, then ( ) 0m kx x xyc c U− ≥ .  If unit costs are positively 
arranged, then ( ) 0k my y yyc c Uε − + ≤  while ( ) 0m kx x xyc c U− ≤  when products substitute in demand.  
Finally, ( ) 0k my y yyc c Uε − + ≥  when unit costs are negatively arranged and k my yc cε < −  .  Thus, a 
small increase in dispersion of unit costs for either product increases social welfare when a) the 
goods complement in demand and unit costs are positively arranged, or b) the goods substitute in 
demand and unit costs are negatively arranged.  
 
2.  Three product model 
In this case the firms produce a third good, z , with quantity nz  at unit cost 
n
zc  for the nth 
firm.  Aggregate output is 
N
nn
Z z∈Ω=∑ , and the product’s sum of unit costs is Nz nznC c∈Ω=∑ .  
With a representative consumer, quasi-linear and concave preferences ( , , , )u X Y Z I I= +  
( , , )U X Y Z , then inverse demands are  
 ( , , ); ( , , ); ( , , ).x y zx y zP U X Y Z P U X Y Z P U X Y Z= = =  (7) 
The nth firm’s profit is  
 .n n n nx x n y y n z z nU c x U c y U c zπ      = − + − + −       (8) 
                                                 
1 This transfer approach can be shown to be equivalent to an increase in variance of the jyc , and 
also to dominance in the majorization pre-ordering.  See pp. 3-12 in Marshall and Olkin (1979).  
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Write the private optimality derivatives in matrix form as  
 
2
2
2
ˆ [ ]
1ˆ [ ] ,
ˆ [ ]
n
x xn yy zz yz yz xz xy zz xy yz yy xz
n
n yz xz xy zz xx zz xz xy xz xx yz y y
n
n xy yz yy xz xy xz xx yz xx yy xy z z
c Ux U U U U U U U U U U U
y U U U U U U U U U U U c U
z U U U U U U U U U U U c U
 − − − −      = − − − −    Γ    − − −  −   
 (9) 
where 0Γ <  due to concavity.  Insert solutions into (8) to see that aggregate profit depends 
directly on  
 
{ } ( ) { } ( )
{ } ( ) { }
{ } { }
2 22 2
22
[ ] [ ]
[ ] 2
2 2 .
N N
N N
N N
n n
yy zz yz x xx zz xz yn n
n n n
xx yy xy z xz yz xy zz x yn n
n n n n
xy yz xz yy x z xy xz xx yz y zn n
U U U c U U U c
U U U c U U U U c c
U U U U c c U U U U c c
∈Ω ∈Ω
∈Ω ∈Ω
∈Ω ∈Ω
− + −
+ − + −
+ − + −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 (10) 
From differentiating (7), assert that x , y , and z  are mutual complements if xz yzU U ≥  
xy zzU U , xy yz xz yyU U U U≥ , and xy xz xx yzU U U U≥ .  Then all three coefficients on the interaction 
sums in (10) are positive.  Under mutual complementarity, therefore, the effect of some cost 
rearrangement on social welfare is determined by the effects on the covariability summations 
N
n n
x yn
c c∈Ω∑ , N n nx zn c c∈Ω∑ , and N n ny zn c c∈Ω∑ . 
Without loss of generality, suppose that firms are ordered in ascending order of marginal 
costs for production of x , i.e., 0 1 1... Nx x xc c c
−≤ ≤ ≤ .  Consider the following change in the 
specification of marginal costs.2 
Case i)   If k jy yc c≤  and k jz zc c≤  for some {0,1, ... , 1}j k∈ − , then map k j ky y yc c c→ =  , jyc →  
k j
y yc c=  , k j kz z zc c c→ =  , j k jz z zc c c→ =  , and leave other costs unchanged.   
Case ii)  If k jy yc c≤  and k jz zc c>  for some {0,1, ... , 1}j k∈ − , then map k j ky y yc c c→ =  , jyc →  
k j
y yc c=  , and leave other costs unchanged.  
Case iii) If k jz zc c≤  and k jy yc c>  for some {0,1, ... , 1}j k∈ − , then map k j kz z zc c c→ =  , jzc →  
                                                 
2 A generalization of the vector rearrangement we are about to explain was developed in Boland 
 7
k j
z zc c=  , and leave other costs unchanged.   
If costs change in this manner, then we say that costs are better ordered in the trivariate 
arrangement increasing (TAI) sense.   
Example 1.  A four-firm three-market oligopoly has cost structure 
 { } { }0 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( , , , ), ( , , , ), ( , , , ) (1,3,4,6), (7,6,5,4), (4,6,2,3) .x x x x y y y y z z z zc c c c c c c c c c c c= =C  (11) 
Now 1 4y yc c≥  and 1 4z zc c≥ , so that case i) applies.  We must interchange both if we are to 
interchange either.  Write the rearranged cost structure as 1 {(1,3,4,6), (4,6,5,7), (3,6,2,4)}=C .  
But the 6 and 5 in the second vector and the 6 and 2 in the third vector are not properly aligned 
with the 3 and 4 in the first vector, another example of case i).  A further rearrangement 
consistent with the idea of TAI is to interchange both at the same time.  Doing so, we obtain 
2 {(1,3,4,6), (4,5,6,7), (3,2,6,4)}=C . 
The x  and y  unit product costs are aligned.  But z  product costs are not aligned with those 
of the other products, an example of case iii).  Switch the 6 with the 4 in that third vector; 3 =C  
{(1,3,4,6), (4,5,6,7), (3,2,4,6)}.  One additional case iii) rearrangement brings costs in line 
across all products, i.e., write 4 {(1,3,4,6), (4,5,6,7), (2,3,4,6)}=C .  Each among this sequence 
of rearrangements weakly increases the values of 
N
n n
x yn
c c∈Ω∑ , N n nx zn c c∈Ω∑ , and N n ny zn c c∈Ω∑ . 
 
Regardless of the number of firms in the industry, a TAI cost rearrangement is designed so 
that 
N
n n
x yn
c c∈Ω∑ , N n nx zn c c∈Ω∑ , and N n ny zn c c∈Ω∑  increase.  Inspection of (10) then establishes  
Proposition 2.  Let x, y, and z be mutual complements in demand.  Then social welfare is larger 
after a TAI in unit costs occurs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Proschan (1988).  See also Hennessy and Lapan (2003). 
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When one or more of weak inequalities xz yz xy zzU U U U≥ , xy yz xz yyU U U U≥ , and xy xzU U ≥  
xx yzU U  fail then the result does not necessarily apply because a firm’s output expansion 
incentives are not well-aligned across products.  Market power considerations mean that lower 
cost firms might not have strong incentives to produce larger quantities of all three commodities.  
The proposition 1 finding on two-product oligopoly under substitution does not extend to multi-
product oligopoly.   There is a unique way to rearrange unit costs in duopoly so that that they are 
less well aligned, and this allows for a substitution result.  There is not a unique way to rearrange 
unit costs across three or more products so that unit costs are less well aligned.  
 
3.  Conclusion 
When there is complementarity in demand, intuition might suggest that more strongly 
correlated unit costs would encourage low cost firms to expand and high cost firms to contract.  
As low cost firms produce more, a cost rearrangement that favors these firms should reduce 
industry costs and increase social welfare.  In controlling for market power effects, our model 
provides formal confirmation for this intuition. 
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